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Introduction
1 Labor  and  trade  union  movements  are  shaped  by  states’  distinctive  socio-economic,
political, cultural, and historical characteristics. In the contemporary world, trade union
movements have weakened considerably due to transformations in production methods
and production management on a global scale. These transformations have also had a
profound impact on the trade union movement in Turkey, but the latter has also been
subject to sui generis historical circumstances which have led it to acquire characteristics
different from those in other countries. In particular, the Turkish regime’s perception of
national security has had a unique impact on Turkish labor and trade union movements.
From the perspective  of  democratization,  it  is  clear  that  this  perception remains  an
obstacle to achieving positive changes in the sphere of rights and freedoms.
2 The concept of “National Security” is found in the domestic law of many countries with
different  political,  social,  and  cultural  structures.  It  is  also  found  as  a  criterion  of
delimitation in supra-national documents(Documents such as the European Convention
on Human Rights (article 8 and protocols 4 and 7). In Turkey, the concept of “National
Security” entered the Constitution and legislation after the 1960 military coup.  Until
then, the dominant concept in Turkish legislation had been “National Defense.” While the
term “defense” mostly denotes the state’s external threat perception, “National Security”
also includes internal threats. Building on this concept, the 1961 Constitution established
a committee named the National Security Council (previously the National Defense High
Committee),  which  was  authorized  to  determine  threats  to  national  security.  The
Perceptions of “National Security” in Turkey and Their Impacts on the Labor M...
European Journal of Turkish Studies, 11 | 2010
1
National Security Council was to determine the state’s threat perception via the National
Security Policy Document, which was to be prepared by its own secretariat. In the future,
this threat perception would be the subject of such a wide interpretation that it would
encompass social, cultural and economic fields. 
3 This  article  examines the impact  of  the perception of  national  security on the labor
movement in Turkey. As is widely known, instead of influencing legislation, the Turkish
labor movement has mainly been the product of it. The state has tried to control unions
through  legal  arrangements,  and  therefore  the  legislation  process  has  had  vital
significance for the labor movement since its inception. This article examines how the
national  security  concept  came to  be  utilized  by  civilian  rulers  to  control  the  labor
movement and to hinder basic trade union activities such as strike. Among other aspects
that condition the dynamics that shape unionism, martial law and the restrictions it puts
on the use of collective rights and freedoms will be examined. 
4 Perceptions of national security in Turkey predate the first explicit appearance of the
concept of “National Security” in 1960. Internal and external threats introduced similar
perceptions in the late Ottoman period, triggering emergency measures such as martial
law and the founding of institutions with emergency powers; as a result, the country took
on the characteristics of a national security state. This article thus begins by investigating
the developments in the last years of Ottoman state. However, it will not go into detail
about the national security perceptions of the Ottoman state, which resulted from the
defeats, external threats, national revolts, and dismemberment the Ottoman state faced
in its last years. To analyze the history of Turkey in an historical perspective, three eras
will be evaluated in detail: theliberation era (from 1918 to 1923), the foundation era (from the
declaration of the Republic in 1923 to World War II) and the multi-party era.
 
I. An Overview of The Perception of “National Security”
in Turkey
The Republican Regime
5 Between 1918 and 1923, a period which this article labels the “liberation era,” the country
was in a state of emergency. The Ottoman state was occupied and in financial crisis, the
Istanbul government was suspended, and most of the army had been disbanded. The new
parliament founded in Ankara in 1920 enacted many laws and established a number of
institutions that were given emergency powers to overcome this state of  emergency,
setting in motion developments that turned the state into a national security state. It
proclaimed martial law, and created institutions such as special military organizations
(the  Mobile Gendarmerie  Detachments  and  the  Military  Police  Organization),
Independence  Courts,  the  Supreme  Military  Command,  Military  Inspectorships,  and
General Inspectorships,  some of which were inherited from the Ottoman state.  While
initially an outcome of the unique conditions of the liberation era, this structure would
persist after the establishment of the Republic in 1923, preparing the infrastructure of
today’s politics. 
6 There are two main reasons why the Republic became a national security state. First, the
cadres  who  built  the  military  and  civil  bureaucracies  of  Republican  regime  were
composed  of  people  who  experienced  both  World  War  I  and  the  Turkish  War  of
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Independence. Because of the traumatizing effect of the long wartime years, these cadres
continually felt the necessity for security and for preventing the trauma from happening
again.  The  second reason  involves  the  revolutionary  process  that  began  with  the
declaration of the Republic. This process not only altered the characteristics of a state
that had reigned for 600 years, but also the regime’s relation to the country’s cultural and
political structures, pushing the regime to secure its preservation and protection. The
Sheikh Said revolt (1925), which occurred in the first years of Republic, fed this security
perception; additionally, the economic depression of the 1930s, World War II, and the
ensuing Cold War kept it alive. The influence of all these emergency conditions caused
the ruling elite to put off expanding rights and freedoms in the legal sphere (Çelik 2008).
7 It  is  understandable  that  a  country  experiencing  internal  and  external  emergencies
would have a higher security perception than a country with ordinary conditions. In the
last decades of the Ottoman Empire and the first decades of the Republic, however, the
state bureaucracy continuously took safety measures for such a long time period that its
heightened sense of emergency gradually became normalized. 
 
The Key Instrument of the “National Security State”: Martial Law 
8 During the last years of the Ottoman Empire, the Ottoman state’s financial and military
weakness led to an increase in social unrest, which was exacerbated by the invasion of
foreign powers. The state had entered a new period in 1876 with the declaration of the
Constitutional Monarchy. Article 113 of the new Constitution authorized the government
to proclaim and implement martial law if there were signs of insurrection in any part of
the country. Thus, the juridical history of martial law in Turkey begins with the 1876
constitution  and  the  qualified  martial  law  enacted  in  1877  (Code  of  Law,  1,  Tertip
C: 4: 71-74; Şensoy 1947). According to this law, the civil government would be authorized
to establish military government (Article 3), and the military government would have the
authority to prohibit  any gatherings in the martial  law area (Code of  Law,  1,  Tertip
C: 4: 71-72; Şensoy 1947).The constitutional period came to end when Sultan Abdülhamid
abolished the parliament in 1878, introducing a period of de facto martial law which went
down in history as the “era of absolute rule.” The country was kept under tight control
under the pretext of “national security” until the constitutional system was reintroduced
by the 1908 revolution. This de facto martial law, in effect, made it easier to oppress what,
because  of  the  Ottoman  Empire’s  low  level  of  industrialization  compared  to  other
European economies, was an inchoate working-class and trade union movement (Sülker
2004). Because the majority of the industrial workforce was composed of minority ethnic
groups  who  were  drawn  to  and  pursued  their  own  nationalist  movements,  a  class
consciousness in the modern sense of the word did not take shape in the late Ottoman
period (Şişmanov 1978). Becausetrade unions were not in existence, the labor movement
was highly limited and workers could only organize under the name of charities and
association.  Some associations that used “labor” in their name (such as the Ottoman
Labor  Association)  were  eliminated,  and  their  administrators  arrested  and  banished
(Makal 1997).
9 The Second Constitutional Monarchy was accompanied by the slogan “freedom, justice,
equality,” and initially reflected positively on the labor and trade union movement. By
reaching out to large segments of workers, the trade union movement leapt forward both
quantitatively and qualitatively. Workers entertained the hope that they would prosper
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through the new regime, and consequently organized strikes in many sectors in which
tens of thousands of workers participated. However, the environment of freedom for the
emerging labor movement came to an end shortly after,  when the government took
measures  to  forestall  the strike actions that  were sweeping the country.  Parliament,
under the control of Committee of Union and Progress (CUP), enacted the Strike Law [
Tatil-i  EşgalKanunu]  on  9  August  1909,  prohibiting  union  activity  in  establishments1
performing service to the public (Makal 1997),  and imposing strict limitations on the
right to strike. This law was a first in the history of Turkish labor relations, and was only
made possible by the martial law that had been proclaimed on 25 April 1909 (Sülker 2004).
10 The martial law that became a structural element of the Second Constitutional Monarchy
was  considered  necessary not  only  for  security  requirements,  but  also  for  the
constitutional  order  that  the  CUP aimed to  establish.  The CUP used the  martial  law
powers that it retained from 1909 to 1918 as a tool to clear the way for the capitalist
relations of production that the committee wanted to establish in the economic sphere
(Kansu 2001). The Strike Law lasted into the Republican era and remained in force until
the Labor Act was enacted in 1936. Since the Strike Law prohibited unions, workers tried
to circumvent the ban by organizing in the form of associations, which were regulated by
the Law of Associations enacted in 1909. This law gave the right to establish certain types
of  associations  without  any  prior  permission;  however,  by  broadening  the  scope  of
prohibited associations and by giving extensive supervisory power over associations to
law enforcement officers, it had a constraining impact on the labor movement (Gülmez
1998: 292; Makal 1997: 280).
11 For the Republican cadres, martial law was initially a necessary instrument for winning
the War of Independence against the invading armies, but with the breakdown of the
ancien régime and foundation of the Republic, its application expanded to internal security
concerns.  Under  the  extraordinary  circumstances  of  wartime,  Turkey  witnessed  the
inclusion of the Chief of General Staff in the Cabinet as a minister.2 Combined with the
new regime’s goals of transforming and “rehabilitating” society and “establishing regime
and state authority,” these public order and security concerns were accompanied by a
number of extraordinary measures. In addition to martial law, the emergency conditions
led to new state institutions with exceptional power, and extraordinary laws left their
mark  on  state-society  relations.  The  Law of  Treason,3 The  Law of  Supreme  Military
Command,4which gave temporary exceptional powers to Mustafa Kemal Pasha, and the
Law of  Independence  Courts5 are  the  most  striking  examples  of  laws  enacted  under
wartime circumstances. 
12 There was thus significant continuity between the last period of the Ottoman state and
the Republican era, in part because the people who implemented the regulations of the
late Ottoman period became the intellectual-bureaucratic cadres of the Republican era.
Also, most of the legal regulations enacted in the last period of the Ottoman state were
incorporated into the legislation of  the Republican era.  The CUP and the Republican
People’s  Party  (RPP),  both  of  which  started  off  by  proclaiming  their  allegiance  to,
respectively, the “Constitution” and “the people’s will,” initially shared power with the
opposition, but later on tended to ignore oppositional groups in order to implement their
own modernization programs. 
13 Martial law was used as an efficient weapon during the post-war period for establishing
public  order,  accomplishing  reforms  and  revolutions,  and  suppressing  counter-
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revolutionary movements, separatist movements, and opponents in parliament and the
press. 
14 These security concerns produced institutions with exceptional power that constantly
maintained martial law practices. For example, the Independence Courts were originally
established for preventing desertion in the army, but they undertook a different mission
in the Republican era, when they were used as an important tool for protecting the new
regime and its reforms. The activities of the original Independence Courts came to an end
on 1 August 1922. However, in 1925, the Sheikh Said Revolt broke out in the eastern
provinces, and martial law was proclaimed in the region (Code of Law, 3, Tertip C: 6).
Later on, as will be discussed below, “The Law for the Establishment of Public Order” [
Takrir-i  Sükûn  Kanunu]was  enacted  on  4  March  1925.  In  addition,  on  the  same  day,
Parliament created two Independence Courts – one in the martial law region and one in
Ankara.  Interestingly,  the Ankara court  also  investigated political  and petty  offenses
committed outside the region of rebellion. According to some researchers, the court
established in Ankara was, in fact, founded to squelch the opponents in parliament who
were in the process of founding a new party (Tunçay 1992: 101; Özdağ 1991: 99-110). Also,
on  3  May  1925,  by  the  Decree  numbered  1846,  the  Censorship  Regulation  [Sansür
Talimatnamesi],which regulated the censorship of newspapers, booklets and letters in the
region, was approved (Code of Law, 3. Tertip, C: 6).
15 When all these are added up, The Law for the Establishment of Public Order not only
became a  tool  for  suppressing  the  rebellion,  but  also  for  forestalling  possible  social
opposition  and  containing  all  political  opposition,  including  the  press,  while
implementing social transformation and undertaking reforms6 (Tunçay 1992; Göldaş 1997;
Öz 1996:  69).  Thus,  the law authorized the government to prohibit  any organization,
provocation, abetment, or publication leading to rebellion or violation of the country’s
social  order,  peace,  calm,  security  and  safety,  and  to  send  the  accused  to  the
independence court.
16 One of the most important consequences of The Law for the Establishment of Public Order
is that the labor movements that re-emerged in Istanbul, and the leftist movements that
had  organic  relationships  with  those  movements,  were  suppressed,  prohibited  and
subjected to state power from the proclamation of the Republic to the present. Although
rights like unionization, the right to strike, and collective bargaining were absent in the
1924 Constitution,  relying on Article  79,  which legitimized the freedoms of  contract,
labor, property, assembly, establishing associations and partnerships, labor organizations
were founded in cities where industrialization was advancing. Previously founded labor
organizations also had the opportunity to organize and express  their  demands more
freely; they even had the opportunity to strike. Various leftist organizations began to
support  this  developing  labor  movement  through  their  publications  and  activities.
However, citing The Law for the Establishment of Public Order, all oppositional leftist
publications  were  prohibited,  and  their  administrators  were  arrested  and  tried  in
Independence  Courts  on  the  charge  of  “corrupting  internal  security  by  means  of
establishing  Communist  organizations  and  propagandizing  Communism,”  and  were
sentenced to heavy punishments (Nedim 1993: 312; Göldaş 1997: 416-416). Some telegraph
workers who went on strike for increased wages were sent to Independence Courts; other
labor organizations were disbanded. Additionally, in the same period, the “Progressive
Republican Party” [Terakkiperver Cumhuriyet Partisi], which was founded by the opponents
in  the  parliament  and  attracted  the  attention  of  the  oppositional  labor  sector,  was
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prohibited.7 The Law for the Establishment of Public Order, which was initially enacted
for a period of 2 years, was extended for another 2 years in 1927. It weakened a class-
based labor and trade union movement in its initial phase by hindering it, and it thereby
determined the direction, development, characteristics and circumstances of the labor
and  trade  union  movements  that  followed  (Türkiye  Sendikacılık  Ansiklopedisi  1998:
135-136; Sülker 1983 :1843-1847). 
17 The martial law practices, were in effect almost continuously for a long time period. In
latter years, martial law was replaced with a “State of Emergency,” the last of which
ended in 2002.  Consequently,  the Republic of  Turkey has been in a constant state of
emergency from its inception until 2002. If the 1908 martial law and the previous 33 years
of  the  “absolute  rule  regime”  of  Abdülhamid  II  are  added,  we  can  conclude  that
governments in Turkey appealed to martial law and states of emergency for a length of
125  years,  from  1877  to  2002.  This  point  should  be  underlined  when  seeking  to
understand the location of the trade union movement in Turkish democracy. Institutions
with exceptional power, political and constitutional regulations, and periods of martial
law and states of emergency lasted more than 100 years, and shaped the labor and trade
union movements to a great extent. 
 
Government with Exceptional Power (1930–1946)
18 In the 1930s, Turkish political elites reacted to the increased security concerns caused by
the global economic depression and the onset of World War II by enacting emergency
laws, taking emergency measures, and establishing institutions with exceptional power,
while increasing the state’s intervention in the economic sphere. In addition, the power
struggle among the dominant powers in the country increased, and the significance of
the military-civil bureaucracy increased vis-à-vis the commercial bourgeoisie and large
landowners.  The  implementation  of  state  capitalism  enhanced  the  impact  of  the
bureaucracy (Kazgan 2005). Especially on the eve of World War II, the ruling politico-
bureaucratic  elite’s  control  over  all  activities  became  tighter.  Many  codes  granting
exceptional authority to the government for regulating the economic and social sphere
were enacted during this period.8
19 In the atmosphere of this emergency period, the parliament enacted the first “Labor Law”
(1936), establishing state dominance over the field of labor relations and enabling the
government, which did not want production to be cut in the circumstances of the period,
to forbid strikes and lock-outs. The new law brought even stricter regulation than the
Ottoman Strike Law that it replaced. Finally, the Associations Law [Cemiyetler Kanunu]
enacted in 1938 forbid class-based associations, depriving workers of the opportunity of
establishing  labor  association  and  trade  unions.  Parliament  once  again  enacted  the
“National Protection Law” [Milli  Korunma Kanunu],  enabling the cabinet to seize firms
temporarily when needed for coordinating the economy. This law aimed to intervene in
the relations  of  production,  and  thereby  to  make  it  possible  to  adjust  relations  of
production in order to boost agricultural production and meet the requirements of the
war. The law allowed the government to intervene in labor issues, and eliminated the
already limited rights  that  were granted by the “Labor  Law” of  1936.  The “National
Protection  Law,”  while  accepting  numerous  rights  and  guaranties  for  the  private
establishments — like providing necessary staff for the private establishments so that
they  could  reach  the  production  goals  that  were  determined  by  the  government —
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included many terms that were against the class interest of workers and small farmers.
For example, citizens could be burdened with compulsory labor for a fee, or the working
hours of the workers could be unilaterally raised (Timur 1994: 178-179). 
20 Because of the strong opposition in commercial and industrial circles to the regime’s
regulation of labor regulations, the RPP sought to control potential sources of opposition
by bringing them together in a new organization. “The Law of Commerce and Industry
Chambers, Chambers of Tradesman, and Commodity Exchanges” [Ticaret ve Sanayi Odaları,
Esnaf Odaları ve Ticaret Borsaları Kanunu] adopted in 1943 was enacted for this purpose. In
the justification for the law, it was stated that it was necessary to enable a strict and
efficient control over the merchant, industrialist and tradesman coteries who failed to
heed the common good. According to the law, the inspection and control of this class,
which was to be recruited into these chambers, was to be carried out by the Ministry of
Trade (Timur 1994: 211). 
21 The most significant impact of all these regulations was the breakdown of the “Coalition
of Classes” that the one-party regime achieved during the foundation era, and as a result
of this, political power and dominant classes (merchant, industrial bourgeoisie and large
landowners) came up against each other.9 While the one-party RPP regime aimed to build
a “classless, egalitarian, merged” society by forestalling class conflicts, the end result was
exactly the opposite: The coalition of classes was replaced with political conflict. This
conjuncture would later lead to the foundation of the Democrat Party (DP) during the
transition to the multiparty system (Timur 1994: 205).
22 By the end of World War II, remarkable developments forced Turkey onto a new path.
The Charter of the United Nations was signed on 26 June 1945 and with it was understood
that the world system was shifting in favor of democratic regimes. Turkish-American
rapprochement resulting from economic and military aid also influenced the internal
politics of Turkey.  In fact, the UN member states had expected that Turkey should alter
its regime to democracy as a signing party.  (Goloğlu 1982:  27).  One of the important
impacts of this was the transition to a multiparty political system. The effects of the shifts
and transformations in this period on the labor movement would prove to be great. The
prohibition  on  founding  associations  based  on  class,  which  was  regulated  by  the
Associations  Law  of  1938,  was  lifted  in  1946  as  the  result  of  the  influence  of  the
international conjuncture, and subsequently many labor unions were established. Due to
the democratic tendencies of the era, two socialist parties appeared in the political arena,
and they played an active role in the organization of unions (Koç 1992: 123). Beginning
from 1945, these liberal developments gave way to new arrangements that would meet
the requirements of the Cold War. Although there was no law prohibiting the formation
of socialist parties, the socialist parties founded at that time and the labor unions which
were associated with them were prohibited. This became possible thanks to the martial
law in Istanbul, which was prolonged on 4 December for another six months. The martial
law’s  justification of  banishment  was  that  these  organizations  were  “serving  foreign
interests” (Ahmad & Ahmad 1976:  27).  Thus,  although the war was over,  martial  law
continued because of of the possibility of going to war.
23 There was no change in the perception of labor and union rights between the years of
1946  and  1960,  the  era  of  multiparty  politics.  This  era  introduced  a  new  kind  of
democracy, but martial law practices amputated its left wing. “The Law of Workers’ and
Employers’  Unions  and  Association  of  Unions”10 stated  that  unions  were  national
associations, and that they could not act against nationalism or national interests. This
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law was enacted to regulate the activities  of  unions that  emerged as  a  result  of  the
amendments  to  the  Associations  Law,  and it  prohibited their  political  activities.  The
prohibition on the right to strike was still in force. According to the Minister of Labor,
who  declared  that  they  would  not  allow  class  struggles,  the  strike  was  a  measure
implemented in liberal regimes, but because Turkey was a statist regime, the government
had to play the role of arbitrator in the conflict among social classes (TBMM Minutes
1950: 221; Ekin 1982: 126). Although the Democrat Party (DP) declared in its campaign
speeches and party program that the right of strike would be adopted, this prohibition
remained in force during the period of DP rule, during which the exigencies of the Cold
War were at the forefront of attention11 (Makal 2002: 314). Indeed, the DP government’s
increasingly autocratic policies practically emulated the preceding single-party period,
passing laws which weakened the political rights of the opposition. 
24 The Inquiry  Committee  [Tahkikat  Encümeni],  which consisted of  DP deputies  and was
founded in 1960 for oppressing the opposition, is an example of this.
25 The DP government enacted a law12 that granted the Committee extraordinary powers,
including ceasing all kinds of political movements and activities (Tanör 2004: 353). By
relying on this law, the DP tried to debilitate the movement through oppressing the labor
movement, unions and Türk-İş,  the Labor Unions Confederation of Turkey, which was
established in 1952. Opponents from unions and intellectual circles reacted strongly to
this repression, and students organized protest marches in Istanbul and Ankara. Martial
law was proclaimed in both cities, universities were suspended temporarily, all kinds of
meetings were prohibited, and many of the opposition newspapers were banned (Ahmad
& Ahmad 1976:  27).  All  of  these  developments  raised  social  unrest,  and the  tension
between  the  actors  of  the  regime  deepened.  At  last,  the  experiment  of  multiparty
competition was interrupted by the military coup on 27 May 1960.
 
1960 Military Coup and Aftermath
26 From the military coup of 27 May 1960 until the normalization of politics by the elections
held on 15 October 1961, the Army held de facto political power through the “Committee
of National Unity” (CNU). At that time, all rights and authorities of TBMM were assumed
by the CNU, which consisted of 38 military officers. The first communiqué of the CNU was
the declaration of curfew. Afterwards the CNU created a new cabinet which included non-
military members, but the country was initially ruled via communiqués promulgated by
the CNU (Code of Law 4, Tertip V, 1, 3-17). The third communiqué prohibited publications
and  activities  of  all  political  parties,  protest  marches  and  meetings.  The  military
explained the reason for the coup in communiqué 32, stating that: 
“National revolution is not an act in favor of a person or a class. Our main principle
is the access of our very revered people, fellow citizens and workers, to democracy,
assurance of their rights and freedoms, and development of their economic welfare.
It is essential that citizens live fraternally and peacefully in their private affairs and
in any kind of working places.” 
27 Communiqué number 19 stated that the TBMM was abolished and that all political parties
were prohibited from arranging political meetings.
28 Meanwhile, martial law, which had been proclaimed by the DP in Istanbul and Ankara on
28 April 1960, was maintained during the period of de facto government, and the garrison
commanders of both cities were appointed as martial law commanders as well (Code of
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Law, 4, Tertip V:1/I: 8). Martial law was maintained in these cities for three months each
time by the CNU’s communiqué number 28 (Code of Law, 4, Tertip V:1/I: 13) and the
CNU’s  act  number  17  (Official  Gazette,  No.  10620,  4.10.1960),  and  by  acts  taken  by
Constituent Assembly in February13, May14 and August15 of 1961.
29 As explained above, although the Republic of Turkey had a national security perception
since its  foundation,  the term “national  security”  appeared for  the first  time in the
constitution adopted after  the 1960 military coup.  Moreover,  it  gained constitutional
characteristic through an assembly with the same name, and further shaped Turkish
politics  through  subsequent  constitutions  and  laws.  Indeed,  the  institution  that
determined  the  content  of  the  National  Security  concept  would  henceforth  be  the
“National Security Assembly.” This assembly and its impacts will be examined in detail
below.
30 As a delimitation criterion, the national security concept has had considerable effects on
political, social and economic activities until today. The tendency for the military and
civil bureaucracy, and, most of the time, governments, to consider all democratic right
demands and problems from the perspective of national security has had the effect of
weakening Turkish democracy. The presence of the Minister of Labor in the National
Security Assembly demonstrated that strikes, resistance and similar activities within the
rising labor movement at the beginning of the 1960s were understood to affect “national
security” (Özdemir 1991: 58). 
31 Because of the relatively liberal characteristic of 1961 Constitution there was actually a
revival of social movements,  including labor organizations and unions. Together with
rights of  labor,  protection of children,  the young and women, recreation,  fair wages,
social  security,  union  rights  bestowed  to  all  wage-earners,  the  Constitution  also
recognized the rights of collective labor bargaining and strike. However, “The Collective
Labor Agreement, Strike and Lock-Out Act” [Toplu İş Sözleşmesi Grev ve Lokavt Yasası] which
was adopted in 1963 imposed many restrictions on the right to strike. The law provided
the Council of Ministers with the power to postpone strikes in cases deemed contrary to
national security, and during periods of martial law, the right to strike was subject to the
permission of the martial law commanders. Strikes were not permitted in regions where
martial law was proclaimed. The frequent recourse to martial law deeply influenced labor
relations as much as other fields in Turkey, because the responsibility for guaranteeing
workers’ constitutional rights was left to the discretion of the military administration.
Civilian authorities took part in curbing these rights by consecutively prolonging martial
law once it had been proclaimed. The declaration of martial law after the second coup
attempt of Colonel Talat Aydemir is an example of this. Although the attempt failed and
all  the  actors  of  the  coup were  caught  and  arrested,  the  one-month martial  law in
Istanbul, Ankara and Izmir was prolonged for five months in Izmir, and extended seven
times in Ankara and Istanbul for a total of fifteen months. Bearing in mind that these
cities were industrialized, it appeared that the fate of workers and trade-union movement
was  left  to  the  mercy  of  martial  law  commanders.  These  martial  law  commanders
sustained the struggle against the socialist-oriented parties that might possibly lead labor
movements. For instance, the Martial Law Commander in Ankara was able to prohibit the
chairperson of the Workers Party of Turkey [Türkiye İşçi Partisi] from entering the capital
(Üskül 1997: 166, 168).
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12 March 1971: the Coup D’état Era
32 The end of the 1960s and the beginning of 1970s was a period in which the rights struggle
of  workers  and  peasants  increased.  The  democratic  rights  stipulated  in  the  1961
Constitution were widely used in that period. The “left-of-centre” approach of the RPP in
1966 and the  establishment  of  DİSK [Confederation  of  Progressive  Trade-Unions]  in  1967
revitalized this dynamism even more. Unlike the state-controlled union Türk-İş, which
was organized predominately in the public sector, DİSK rapidly organized in the private
sector as a confederation of trade-unions that had separated from Türk-İş. It adopted a
policy of economic and political struggle in the name of the working class, and did not
abstain from conflict with government, employers and competitor trade-unions. With its
influence and membership increasing, DİSK opposed Türk-İş’s decision to adopt policies
in harmony with the government. From an initial 40 thousand members DİSK reached 100
thousand by 1970, and at the same time, mobility among workers and students in the
country had increased and socialist movements gained strength (Güzel 1996: 238).
33 In that period, these developments were discussed within the context of “disturbance of
peace” by the National Security Council and the government. The 1961 Constitution was
seen as the cause of the disturbances, and debates over the need for amendment of the
constitution were constantly on the agenda. By 1970, the Demirel Government proposed
an amendment to the Trade-Unions Law number 274 and the Collective Labor Agreement,
Strike and Lock-Out Act number 275 that would curb unionization and the right to strike.
The objective of this amendment was to weaken or even prohibit trade unions that were
in conflict with the government. During the Türk-İş Congress in Erzurum, Minister of
Labor Turgut Toker stated that DİSK was going to be liquidated by the new draft and that
it would remain impossible to recognize the right of general strike as long as DİSK existed
(Işıklı 1990: 346).
34 Arguing that new draft law was targeted at its organization, DİSK reacted by holding mass
workers’ actions in Istanbul and Kocaeli, known as the Events of 15-16 June. One of the
important  characteristics  of  this  mass  action  was  that,  except  for  a  few  public
corporations, it was conducted entirely by workers from the private sector. After the
events, 5090 workers were fired and twenty-one DİSK managers were arrested, dealing a
heavy blow to the political development of the Turkish working class and trade-union
movement (Koç 1992: 180-181).
35 Martial law was immediately proclaimed with the justification that this action was not
planned by  workers  and their  unions,  but  by  communists,  and that  it  constituted a
rebellion. In a speech expressing justification for martial law, Minister of Internal Affairs
Haldun  Menteşoğlu  said  that  DİSK  aimed  at  dividing  the  country  by  fostering  class
consciousness (Üskül 1997: 177). This speech demonstrated that the single party regime’s
denial of class divisions was still in effect. The government, which pointed to the Workers
Party of Turkey as the main ringleader behind the events, prolonged martial law for two
months beyond the original one-month proclamation (Üskül 1997: 182).
36 On  12  March  1971,  the  Turkish  Armed  Forces  again  intervened  in  political  life  by
submitting a memorandum which caused the government to resign. A new government
was formed without the existing parties on 26 March 1971, and soon after proclaimed
martial  law in eleven provinces (Official  Gazette,  27.4.1971,  No.  13820).  After this,  an
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extraordinary interim regime brought serious restrictions on basic rights and freedoms
granted by the 1961 Constitution. 
37 From  the  1971  memorandum  until  1974,  four  laws  were enacted  in  order  to
comprehensively  amend  the  Constitution.  Law  number  1488  (September  20,  1971)
imposed new delimitation criteria by amending Article 11 of the 1961 Constitution, where
the essence of the basic rights was defined. One of those criteria was that of “National
Security.”  Furthermore,  “National  Security”  was  used  to  delimit  Article  29,  which
regulated the right of association, and Article 46, which regulated the right to establish
trade unions. The right to be a member of trade unions for civil servants was abolished by
an amendment to Article 119. The same law also expanded the scope of Article 124 of the
Constitution, which defined the conditions necessitating the proclamation of martial law.
The “emergence of open indications for widespread violent actions” was added to the list
of  reasons  that  justified  the  proclamation  of  martial  law.  The  authority  that  would
determine  these  open-ended  justifications  for  martial  law  would  be  the  Council  of
Ministries itself.
38 In addition, a new Martial Law Act number 1402 was adopted (Official Gazette, 15.05.1971,
N° 13837). This act declared that in the regions of martial law, duties and authorities of
law-enforcement officers would be granted to martial  law commanders,  and that the
martial  law  commanders  could  restrict  the  use  of  some  of  rights  and  liberties,  or
completely suspend them. Moreover, in accordance with Article 11 of law 1402, courts-
martial would have authority in the regions of martial law. 
 
The 1982 De Facto Regime and the 1982 Constitution
39 Turkey experienced a serious economic crisis between 1977 and 1980. In order to resolve
the crisis, on 24 January 1980, conservative Süleyman Demirel’s government drafted a
plan to restructure the labor market in ways opposed to the interests of the workers.
Although these decisions could not be implemented because of the 1961 Constitution and
social reactions, the military coup staged 9 months later, on 12 September 1980, allowed
them to be put into practice. Those who took power during this coup formed a National
Security Council16 consisting of the Commander and Commanders-in-Chief of the Turkish
Armed Forces.
40 The  National  Security  Council,  which  assumed both  executive  and legislative  power,
implemented  important  decisions  regarding  labor  life.  Martial  law  was  proclaimed
throughout the country. Strikes and lock-outs were postponed. Activities of some of the
trade unions and associations were stopped and their money was blocked. Workers on
strike were forced to go back to work, and it was decided that additional payments at the
rate of 70 percent would be made in advance in working places with collective bargaining.
Leaving the country was banned (Tanör et al. 2004: 24). A High Board of Arbitration [
Yüksek Hakem Kurulu]  was assigned for labor disputes,  and was empowered to render
binding decisions on workers’ wages for four years (Tanör 1992 :35). Among all trade
unions, the perpetrators of the 1980 coup almost exclusively targeted DİSK (Güzel 1996:
257-258). As a result of this, it could be said that the coup destroyed the organization of
trade unions in the private sector, and its impact has lasted until today.
41 The National Security Council maintained its legislative activity after the adoption of a
new constitution. Among the laws the NSC enacted on the basis of the temporary Article 8
of the constitution, the Law on Trade Unions number 2821, Law on Associations number
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2098, and the Law on Meetings and Demonstrations number 2911 are the most relevant
for this article.
42 The 12 September regime restricted public liberties and curbed basic rights. Labor life
was  especially  restructured  by  martial  law commands.  Meetings  and demonstrations
were  subject  to  prior  permission.  Unprecedented  restrictions  were  imposed  on  the
activities  of  associations.  Labor  rights  and  especially  trade  union  activities  were
suspended and the right to strike was prohibited.
43 It  was  during  this  extraordinary  period that  the  Army command prepared the  1982
Constitution. Discontent about the broad definition of collective rights and freedoms in
the 1961 Constitution was widespread within the NSC, especially when collective social
rights  were in question.  Therefore,  although the new constitution clearly recognized
standard rights such as the right to strike, collective bargaining, and unionization rights,
it also restricted the establishment of trade unions and their activities “for the purpose of
protecting  the  integrity  and  indivisibility  of  the  homeland  and  the  nation,  national
sovereignty, the Republic, public order, public peace, public interest, public morality and
public health.” The preference for such open-ended formulations posed various practical
problems  because  they  were  open  to  subjective  interpretations  and  arbitrary
implementations (Özveri 1991: 63, 93).
44 After the 1980 coup, the National Security Council’s authority increased. In particular, the
By-law of Secretariat General of the National Security Council [Milli Güvenlik Kurulu Genel
Sekreterliği Yönetmeliği] was rewritten to deal with all spheres of daily life in Turkey. The
National  Security  Council  interpreted the  national  security  concept  broadly,  and the
Secretariat  General  interfered in  all  spheres  of  social  and political  life  by  subjecting
society to various psychological operations (Çelik 2008). 
 
II. The NATIONAL SECURITY CONCEPT and the
NATIONAL SECURITY COINCIL (NSC)
National Security in Turkish Legislation
45 In Turkey, the concept of national security has been used as a delimitation criterion for
the rights and freedoms stipulated both in constitutional texts and in subsequent laws.
But “national security” is a wide concept, subject to interpretations that can be expanded
according to personal opinions and understandings. 
46 Although it  is  frequently mentioned in Turkish law, “national  security” has no clear
definition, neither in the law of the 1949 High Council of National Security (Code of Law 3.
Tertip C: 30: 1077), nor in the 1962 law of National Security Council (Code of Law 5, Tertip
C: 2: 325–327). One definition is found in Article 3(a) of the By-Law of Secretariat General
of National Security Council: 
National  Security:  Being  able  to  resist  all  external  or  internal  attacks,  defeatist
attempts, natural disasters and conflagrations. National security means to protect
and  maintain  the  state  authority  and  using  all  national  strength,  efforts  and
activities for being victorious in a war. 
47 In the 1983 “Law of the National Security Council and Secretariat General of the National
Security Council” number 2945, the definition is: 
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National Security;  The protection and maintenance of  the constitutional  order,
national presence, integrity, all political, social, cultural and economic interests in
international field as well as against any kind of internal and external threats, of
the State (md.2/a)
48 In the act of the 1969 “General Assembly of the Lawsuit Department of the Council of The
State”  [Danıştay  Dava  Daireleri  Genel  Kurulu],  national  security  means  “to  protect  and
secure the legal entity of the State against the internal and external threats emerging
throughout the country.”17During early 2000s, Turkey witnessed rapid legislative activity
within the framework of the EU Harmonization Laws, which were presented as radical
democratization reforms. However, although the NSC Law was amended and a new by-law
of Secretariat General of the NSC was enacted, the concept of national security and the
legislation within many of the spheres penetrated by national security policy remained
untouched, a situation still in need an explanation (Gemalmaz & Gemalmaz n.d.: 247).
Until the amendment number 4709 October 2001, there remained a delimitation criterion
in Article 13 of the 1982 Constitution under the title “Restriction of Fundamental Rights
and Freedoms.” There was no change in the definition in law 2945 on the NSC after the
2003 amendment (Official Gazette, 18.1.2002, No: 24997), and the definition in the new By-
Law of  Secretariat  General  of  NSC is  the same as the definition found in the law.  In
addition to many other articles in the 1982 Constitution, “national security” is still used
as a delimitation criterion in Article 51, which regulates union rights. Apart from the
constitution, this criterion also exists, directly or indirectly, in other laws in force. One
reason for  this  might  be that  it  makes it  possible  to  adapt  the concept  to  changing
requirements and threat considerations. Thus, the legal definition of national security as
encompassing “all spheres, including political, social, cultural and economical” provides
the regime with extensive leeway in defining national security as it sees fit. 
 
The Institutionalization of the National Security Regime: National
Security Council (NSC)
49 As mentioned previously, the concept of national security entered the constitution and
laws after the 1960 coup, replacing the concept of “national defense.” Thus, in the first
draft of 1961 Constitution proposed by the military officers who staged the coup, the
“High Council of National Defense” was renamed the “National Security Council.” This
council was first established in 1933 as the High Defense Council, and was given the task
to  indicate  the  responsibilities  of  the  different  Ministries  during  mobilization  and
determine  appropriate  principals.  The  council  reconstituted  under  the  name  “High
Council of National Defense” in 1949 to organize “total national defense,” a concept that
gained importance after World War II. Finally, when the “National Security Council” was
established by the 1961 Constitution, the term “defense” was replaced with “security.”
This renaming, which might seem insignificant, would later be used to justify a number of
proscriptive  regulations,  and its  impact  on  the  development  of  the  labor  movement
would be negative. First, it is useful to examine how this shift occurred.
50 During World War II, a National Security Council was established in the United States in
order  to  coordinate  action  between  different  levels  of  the  U.S.  Army  and  the  U.S.
government. After the war, the Council gradually shifted its sphere of activities to the
emerging  Cold  War.  The  enactment  of  the  Internal  Security  Act  in  1950  and  the
enactment of the Communist Control Act in 1954 clearly demonstrates the influence of
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the Cold War on internal security concerns. The “National Security Doctrine” developed
in the 1960s further demonstrated a shift in the American national security perception.
Turkey, in turn, reconfigured its institutions under the influence of this perception.18
51 The inclusion of the National Security Council in the 1961 Constitution was a result of the
the military bureaucracy’s search for an institution to control civilian governments in
reaction to the Menderes government’s challenges to the Army’s dominance. The NSC
was designed as  a  “Kemalist  Bloc” (Tunaya 1970:  2)  to  include the army,  which was
considered the guarantee of the regime against the fluctuating nature of politics. The
1961 Constitution distributed state power and sovereignty among different organs and
institutions, and thereby created a set of checks and balances among them. Thus, within
the framework of the separation of powers principle, the NSC would become a barrier
against  an elected government’s  “I  can do anything” attitude.  The National  Security
Council’s duties are stated in Article 111 of the 1961 Constitution: “The National Security
Council  shall  communicate requisite fundamental  recommendations to the Council  of
Ministers with the purpose of assisting in the making of decisions related to national
security and coordination.”  The Council,  which was initially  designed as  an advisory
organ,  gradually  expanded  its  authority  and  sphere  of  duty.  In  Article  118  of  1982
Constitution the National Security Council was authorized to make recommendations on
the formulation,  establishment and implementation of national security policy to the
Council of Ministers. After the institutions associated with the Secretariat General of the
National  Security  Council  prepare  a  draft  document,  the  “National  Security  Policy
Document” is recommended to the Council of the Ministers, where it, upon the latter’s
approval, becomes valid policy. This document is constantly updated in accordance with
evolving  threat  perceptions,  and  has  had  the  cumulative  effect  of  reigning  in  the
authority of the executive. 
52 Although Article 118 of the 1982 Constitution stipulated that decisions of the National
Security  Council  will  not  be  binding  for  the  civilian  government,  the  definition  of
“national  security” in law number 2945 subordinate the government to the National
Security  Council  in  all  matters  included within  the definition,  requiring  it  to  act  in
accordance with the NSC’s perception of national security. To be sure, the amendment
made in the NSC Law on 30 August 2003, rendering the NSC’s decisions purely advisory,
reduced the administrative power of the NSC. However, this reduction is not enough. The
effects of national security policy are not limited to the Council of Ministers. Ministries
and lower state organs are also obliged to act in accordance with national security policy;
thus like all ministers, the Minister of Labor and Social Security is also obliged to take
into account national security policy .19
53 When all of this legislation is examined, it appears that no state institutions in Turkey can
make or implement policy without considering national security policy. National security
pervades all legislation. However, what is more striking still is the fact that the concept of
“national security policy” still exists in the legislation issued by civilian governments.
The legal reforms realized in 2003 in the context of Turkey-EU relations did nothing to
reverse this (Gemalmaz & Gemalmaz n.d.: 247). 
54 All of these developments are connected to the concept of “national security” and to the
wide interpretation of what fields are considered contiguous. The NSC seems interested
in all subjects, whether political, social, cultural, economic, or foreign policy. The NSC
makes  recommendations  about  the  legislative  activities  of  Parliament,  and  takes
considers student incidents, which would normally be considered a problem of public
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order, into its consideration of national security. Although it is supposed to be merely an
advisory organ to the Council of Ministers, the extensive administrative power of the NSC
and its authority in an endless number of subjects almost makes it a “shadow cabinet.”
However, despite this, it is difficult to say that the NSC acts illegally. This becomes clear
when we look at the authority granted to the Secretariat General, which is an integral and
crucial part of the NSC. In Article 22, Paragraph (f) of a regulation dated 17 April 1963
(6/1645), which was issued during the period when the 1961 Constitution was in force, the
Secretariat  General  of  the  NSC  was  assigned  the  task  of  making  any  policies  and
completing legislation for the conservation and continuity of government authority. This
provision itself  makes the NSC more than just  a  consultative body (Bilgen 1976:  58).
Paragraph (e) of the same law authorized the NSC to deal closely with legislation related
to National Security Policy, and if necessary, to issue, develop, adjust and amend new
legislation. In addition, the authority of the NSC was increased significantly by the secret
regulation  84/7706  from 10  February  1984.  As  a  result,  the  NSC  has  influence  over
economic and social spheres, and can include measures that it considers necessary in
regulating the state budget. 
 
III. “National Security” Versus Union Activities
55 The concept of national security is deeply ambiguous, and therefore paves the way for
arbitrary  practices.  As  a  delimitation criterion it  has  had negative  impacts  on labor
movement and union activities. For instance, a basic union right such as the right to
strike can be restricted or postponed for national security purposes, depriving unions of
their most efficient weapon and rendering them weak. As mentioned previously, the 1961
Constitution legally granted all wage earners collective rights and freedoms such as union
rights,  collective  labor  bargaining  and the  right  to  strike.  In  spite  of  this,  the  1963
“Collective Labor Agreement, Strike and Lock-Out Act” (number 275) placed numerous
restrictions on right to strike. The Act granted the Council of Ministers the authority to
postpone strikes for 30 days, and to extend the ban for 60 days if the strike was deemed
contrary  to  national  security.  The same law made the  right  to  strike  subject  to  the
permission of martial law commanders during periods of martial law, but martial law
commanders also illegitimately used the government’s authority to postpone strikes, and
interfered in collective bargaining. The silence on these issues of the prime ministers to
whose authority martial law commanders were subject reveals the civil administrations’
deference to military authorities (Üskül 1996: 237; Şafak 2008: 51). 
56 In the “Collective Labor Agreement, Strike and Lock-Out Act”20number 2822, which was
enacted after 1980 coup,  the concept of  national  security was used as a delimitation
criterion over the right to strike. Article 33 granted the Council of Ministers the authority
to postpone strikes and lockouts: “Any lawful strike or lock-out that has been ordered or
commenced may be suspended by order of the Council of Ministers for sixty days if it is
likely to be detrimental to public health or national security.” The article does not clarify
whether a union can use the right to strike or not once the sixty days are over. But both
the 1982 Constitution (Article 54) and Article 34 of law 2822 state that in cases where the
strike is  postponed or suspended,  the dispute will  be resolved by the High Board of
Arbitration, in other words through compulsory arbitration. Thus, it could be said that
with  law  number  2822  the  government’s  intervention  in  strikes  in  the  form  of
postponement  de  facto eliminated  the  right  to  strike  through  administrative  rulings
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(Topalhan 2003). In addition, law number 2822 stated that the court could not give an
injunction order in the case of a postponement order for strikes and lockouts in areas
where under a state of emergency. 
57 Strikes have also been discussed in NSC meetings. For instance, in the NSC meeting on 28
September 1995, where the Northern Iraq problem was being discussed, the widespread
strikes  being  held  in  the  public  sector  were  also  discussed,  and because  these  were
deemed “threatening [to] the security of the country,” the NSC recommended postponing
the strike.21 The civilian authorities, in turn, have not been far behind the military in
relating strikes to “national security” during the periods in which law 275 and 2822 were
in force. When we analyze the seventeen years during which law number 275 remained in
force, we see that civilian governments issued a total of 252 postponement decrees. Of
these  decrees,  157  postponed  strikes  for  thirty  days  each,  and  ninety-three  decrees
extended the  postponement  period for  sixty  days.  Of  the  251  postponement  decrees
issued with justification, 153 were justified for reasons of “national security,” forty-three
for  threatening  “national  health,”  and  fifty-five  on  the  grounds  of  both  “national
security” and “national health.” In other words, of the 251 postponement decrees, the
justification in sixty-one percent of  the cases was national  security concerns,  and in
twenty-two percent both national security and national health concerns (Topalhan 2003:
14).
58 Between  1983  and  2007,  the  governments  issued  twenty-seven  strike  postponement
decrees. For twenty of these decrees, national security was used as justification. During
this  period  more  than 500  workplaces  and  businesses  were  affected  by  the  decrees,
including about 300.000 workers. When the matter is viewed in light of these data, it is
possible  to  see  how  great  the  impact  of  strike  postponement  decisions  justified  by
national security were on the Turkish workers’ movement and trade-unions (Çelik 2008:
109). 
59 It must also be mentioned that since 2000 nine great strikes took place in the factories
belonging  to  Turkey’s  leading  industrial  groups,  and  eight  of  these  were  arbitrarily
postponed  by  the  government  on  the  grounds  of  “national  security”  (Çelik  2005,
2007).The fact that upon judicial review most of the postponement decisions were either
rejected by stay of execution, or abrogated, attests to this arbitrariness.22 For example,
after  the  Council  of  State  provided  a  stay  of  execution  for  the  government’s
postponement decision on 8 December 2003, the strike that had been held by the Kristal-
İş  trade-union  was  resumed  on  14  February  2004;  however,  the  government  again
postponed the strike, this time adding “public health” concerns to its previous “national
security”  justification.  The Council  of  State  abrogated the  decision of  the  Council  of
Ministers, stating that “the postponed strike does not impair the national security and
the public health as stipulated in the law.” According to the Council of State, “A strike can
be  regarded  as  impairing  the  national  security  only  if  serious  dangers  necessitate
defending and securing the country and the state specially.”23
60 Since in practice the government has tended to refer to the opinion of the Secretariat
General of the NSC when considering whether to postpone strikes, it will be helpful to
give  an  example  of  the  national  security  justifications  that  the  Secretariat  General
provides in its “strike postponement” reports. When justifying postponing a strike in the
rubber sector,  for example, the Secretariat argued as follows: “In consequence of the
examinations and assessments, (…) it has been established that since a very big part of the
national rubber production is provided by the these workplaces, the decision to strike
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will  adversely  affect  the  rubber  needs  of  all  sectors,  in  particularly  that  of  the  TAF
(Turkish  Armed  Forces),  which  uses  transportation  and  construction  equipment;
additionally, because of the ongoing economical bottleneck, it can cause a crisis in the
automotive industry and disturb the economical  balance,  and may have a  disruptive
impact on public life and therefore on the national security of our country, which is
undergoing a delicate period because of the ongoing developments in the Middle East.”24
61 However, the fact that the government also postpones strikes that the Secretariat General
does  not  find  threatening  to  national  security25 shows  that  the  real  motive  in
postponement is not “national security,” but that the mentality that dominated the de
facto martial law period is maintained by later civilian governments (and recently also by
the ‘civilian’  president  who signed these postponement  decisions).  The government’s
interpretation of national security is revealed in its pronouncements regarding strike
postponements.  In  the  annulment  suit  that  a  trade  union  brought  against  a
postponement decision of the Council of Ministers regarding a strike held in a bottle-
glass sector, the government argued that the strike would “cause a significant decrease in
the export incomes, that this situation will damage the national economy, that today the
concept of “national security” necessitates and includes a strong economy, and that every
attempt at damaging the national economy also damages national security.”26
62 The arbitrary and frequent usage of the ambiguous “national security” criterion thus
constitutes  a  great  obstacle  in  the  development  of  the  workers’  movement and  in
carrying out trade-union activities.
 
Conclusion
63 The Turkish regime’s national  security has occupied a significant position in Turkish
legislation, and has deeply affected labor relations. By relying on internal and external
national security concerns, emergency regimes and military coups, which have been in
effect  for  nearly  125  years,  have  caused  political  elites  to  perceive  this  situation  as
normal. Until recently, this perception has resulted in a preference for martial law and
states  of  emergency  over  existing  legal  frameworks.  These  extraordinary  legal  and
institutional conditions have shaped the Turkish labor movement, as well as the state
apparatus and bureaucracy. If we consider that the first known labor organization in the
Ottoman State was established in 1861, Turkish labor activism has a history stretching
back 148 years. The fact that the country was under martial law and states of emergency
for 125 of those years has prevented the formation of a free and democratic atmosphere,
which  would  have  been  necessary  for  the  flourishing  of  a  labor  and  trade  union
movement.
64 During  the  martial  law  regimes,  many  constitutional  rights  and  freedoms  could  be
restricted  or  suspended,  if  necessary  all  of  them.  Martial  law  therefore  became  a
repressive  instrument  used  against  the  Turkish  labor  movement.  By  using  this
instrument, political elites took measures that would have been difficult to take at normal
times. They condoned the illegal practices of military administrations, which often went
beyond the limitations set forth in proclamations of martial law. For this reason, the
proclamation of martial law more often than not meant that the actions taken to preserve
national  security  by  martial  law authorities  were  sustained  or  supported  by  civilian
leaders (Duran: 172). 
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65 In cases where these practices fell short, Turkey experienced military interventions, in
1960, in 1971 and in 1980. All these emergency practices and interventions were the result
of perceived threats to “national security.” Perceiving communism as a threat to national
security, the regime was frightened by labor movement and trade union activities. While
the regime created a state-mandated atmosphere for trade union activity in order to
control  the  labor  movement,  it  also  wished  to  forestall  the  emergence  of  class
consciousness. The national security regime therefore confronted socialist movements
and parties, and through this confrontation, excluded from the political system those
elements  that  might  have  led,  guided  or  supported  the  Turkish  labor  movement.
Deprived of the intellectual contributions of socialist parties, the trade union movement
was disorientated and thus unable to develop an effective strategy. It  is obvious that
pinning the  responsibility  for  the  problems concerning the  Turkish labor  movement
solely on policies implemented by military coups and the de facto regime organs that
produced this legislation is not a sufficient explanation. The real problem here is that,
even during civilian regimes, politicians also acted with the mentality and approach of
the  de  facto martial  law regimes.  Aziz  Nesin  conceptualized  these  practices  as  “civil
martial law.” (Uskul 1997), Thus, the fact that the constitutional and legal regulations
that made the restriction of rights and freedoms possible for national security purposes
were maintained during civilian governments demonstrates the normalization of an anti-
democratic structure of government. The inclusion in the draft constitution prepared by
the Justice and Development Party government in 2007 of the concept of national security
as  a  delimitation  criterion  for  establishing  trade  unions,  collective  bargaining
agreements, and right to strike, proves that “civil martial law” survives today.
66 Furthermore, the Republican ideal of becoming a “classless, egalitarian, merged” society
hindered  the  emergence  of  a  tradition  for  resolving  problems  through  democratic
institutions and mechanisms. In its by-laws from 1923 and 1927, the RPP claimed that “in
Turkey, there are no classes having divergent interests and therefore clashing with each
other,” adding that “the people of the Republic of Turkey do not consist of different
classes” to its 1931 program. This conception ultimately led the RPP to the idea that trade
unions are unnecessary in a “classless, egalitarian, merged” society. As a reflection of
this,  in its  program on 1935 the RPP adopted the view that labor disputes would be
“resolved by the judgment of conciliator institutions created by state” and “strike and
lock-out should be prohibited.” Finally, the RPP’s position was legislated by way of the
prohibition of class-based organizations put forth in the Law on Associations enacted in
1938. The “classless, egalitarian, merged” society model was to be realized, if necessary,
through martial law.
67 Although its attitude varied from one period to the next,  the state’s stance on trade
unions  has  generally  been  interventionist,  restrictive  and  exclusive.  Almost  all
governments in Turkey have been suspicious of collective rights and freedoms, and they
have seen potential anti-state elements in all  organizations.  For this  reason,  a union
movement  shaped by its  own dynamics  never  emerged in  Turkey.  In  particular,  the
arrest, firing, and repression of leading workers in times of martial law weakened the
labor movement’s leadership. To overcome obstacles in its quest for economic order and
development, the state sometimes ignored trade unions and sometimes cooperated with
them. While cooperative trade unions were supported, hard-liners were accused of being
“supporters  of  communism,” and subjected to sanctions.  Other times,  only the trade
unions willing to cooperate were allowed to exist. For example, DİSK, which never gave
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an inch to state demands, was a target of state repression during the 1980 military coup.
It was only after the prohibition of DİSK that the economic reforms proposed in January
1980 could be carried out in the private sector without resistance. The result of these
developments  was  that  trade unions  tended to  accommodate political  power,  and to
integrate with the state as a way of legitimizing themselves. Instead of putting pressure
on political power, they preferred to cooperate with political elites.
68  “National security” was the major justification for these restrictions and interventions,
but such justifications were arbitrary and for the most part unconvincing. The fact that
national security was mentioned even in irrelevant circumstances is a serious problem
that  cannot  be  explained  by  the  routine  habits  of  lawmakers  and  bureaucrats.  A
democratic  atmosphere  is  the  most  important  condition  for  the  development  of
unionism,  and trade unions,  in turn,  often act  as  important  pressure groups for  the
development  of  a  country’s  democracy.  In  Turkey,  however,  “national  security”
perceptions does not provide such an opportunity to trade unions.
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Parlamento Tarihi, Milli Mücadele ve TBMM, I.Dönem: 93; Çelik 2008: 125
3.  Hıyanet-i Vataniye Kanunu,dated 29 April 1920 and numbered 2
4.  Başkomutanlık Kanunu,dated 5 September 1921 and numbered 144
5.  İstiklal Mahkemeleri Kanunu, dated 31 July 1922 and numbered 249
6.  All of the major reforms of the early Republican era (secularism, changes in appearance, the
abolishment of lodges, etc.) came into life in this period. 
7. The Liberal Republic Party, which was founded in 1930s, would also be prohibited because of a
similar case, and the ruling party felt it necessary to rely on emergency laws for implementing
the changes it sought to impose on Turkish society.
8.  See, for example, “Settlement Act” dated 1 July 1926 and numbered 885, “Settlement Act”
dated 1934 and numbered 2510, “Obligation for National Defense Law” dated 7 June 1939 and
numbered 3634, “National Protection Law” dated 18 January 1940 and numbered 3870, and “Law
of Armed Defense Obligation Against the Domestic Enemy” dated 7 August 1944 and numbered
4654. After this law, a by-law of it was enacted: numbered 3/3169, “By-law of Armed Defense
Obligation  Against  the  Domestic  Enemy,”  “Law  on  Evacuation  and  Rarefaction  of  Provinces,
Towns and Villages in Necessary conditions” dated 1944 and numbered 4656. 
9. For the  social  fluctuations  and political  projections  of  those  regulations,  see:  Timur,  ibid,
pp. 171-226; Timur, Taner (2003) Türkiye’de Çok Partili Hayata Geçiş, 3rd ed., Ankara, İmge Yayınevi;
Makal,  Ahmet  (2002)   Türkiye’de  Çok  Partili  Dönemde  Çalışma  ilişkileri:  1946-1963,  Ankara,  İmge
Yayınevi;  Çavdar,  Tevfik  (2004)  Türkiye’nin  Demokrasi  Tarihi:  1839,1950,  3rd  ed.,  Ankara,  İmge
Yayınevi; Avcıoğlu, Doğan (1987) Türkiye’nin Düzeni: Dün Bugün Yarın, Birinci Kitap, Istanbul, Tekin
Yayınevi.
10.  İşçi ve İşveren Sendikaları ve Sendika Birlikleri Hakkında Kanun, numbered 5018 and adopted in
1947.
11. During this period, although the legislation preventing strikes and lockouts inhibited the
emergence the labor movement, there were actions that could be considered employer lockouts
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rather than worker strikes. Besides the financial potential of the employers, lack of inspection
and the  gaps  in  the  clauses  of  the  Labor  Law which regulated  the  subject,  it  was  seen that
employers could more easily dismiss workers. 
12. The Law on Duties and Authorities of Inquiry Committees of the Turkish Grand National
Assembly dated 27 April 1960 and numbered 7468. This law gave the Inquiry Committee all the
rights and authority that was granted to coroner and magistrate. This committee also had the
authority  to  ban  and  seize  any  publication  and  to  close  their  printing  house,  and  to  take
measures and decisions on political gatherings and activities. 
13. The Act of Constituent Assembly dated 24 February 1961 and numbered 41, Code of Law, 4.
Tertip, V: 1/1, no.1551.
14. The Act of Constituent Assembly dated 22 May 1961 numbered 55, Code of Law, 4. Tertip,
V: 1/II, no.2628.
15. The Act of Constituent Assembly dated 16 August 1961 and numbered 68, Code of Law, 4.
Tertip, C: 1/II, no.3010.
16.  It is remarkable that this organization, which was founded for another purpose but later on
shifted its sphere of duty to internal security activities,  also had the name National Security
Council.
17.  General  Assembly  of  the  Lawsuit  Department  of  the  Council  of  The  State,  19.09.1969,
Esas:1967/711 and Act:1969/652.
18.  This line of thinking is confirmed by the statement made in justification of the draft bill for
the NSC law: “The revisions of the advanced countries on their similar organizations after the II.
World War were taken into account.” TBMM Minutes, V: 8, 1962, No 209.
19. The Law on the Organization and Duties of Ministry of Labor and Social Security dated 9 January
1985 and numbered 3146 (Article 5). 
20.  Official Gazette, 07.05.1983, No 18040.
21.  “MGK Demanded, Agreement is on the Way” Özgür Yaşam Dergisi, 7-13 September 1995, No 1,
pp. 28-30.
22. It has been established by judicial decisions that none of the postponed strikes are related to
national  security.  Indeed,  it  is  difficult  to  understand how the tea glasses,  drink bottles  and
automobile  tires  produced  in  these  factories  threaten  the  national  security  of  Turkey.  The
common feature of the aforementioned nine strikes is that they were powerful, and took place in
factories  belonging  to  Turkey’s  leading  industrial  groups.  ”Ordinary  strikes”  that  do  not
challenge the established order and the big capital circles are generally allowed. Furthermore,
experience shows that these drawn-out “ordinary strikes” provide an opportunity to weaken
workers  and  trade-unions.  Therefore  in  almost  all  strike  postponement  decisions,  the
government abuses its legal authority and uses the national security justification to protect the
competitiveness of the employers (Çelik 2005).
23. Tenth Department of State of Council, Docket No 2004/2197 Decision No 2006/3982. 
24. The document designed by the Secretariat General of NSC, 26.02.2003 dated and 7010-17-03
numbered.  (The document has been provided by Aziz Çelik,  Assistant Professor of  Faculty of
Economics  and  Administrative,  Department  of  Labor  Economics  and  Industrial  Relations  in
Kocaeli University).
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ABSTRACTS
The Turkish army has played a major role as custodians of the state since the beginning of the
republic. Toward this end, the armed forces have intervened directly in the country’s politics
three times. These interventions have taken various forms, and even in the course of the periods
of  normalization  of  military-civilian  relations,  the  concept  of  national  security  has  strongly
influenced the trade unions and the labor policies as a whole. Although the principal objective of
trade unions has been defending the employment and the livelihoods of workers, and to build a
better  working  environment  in  the  workplace  in  general,  trade  union  organizations  have
historically  been  organized  and  functioned  under  the  shadow  of  national  security  related
concerns  in  Turkey.  As  we  discuss  in  this  paper,  even  though  the  trade  union  movement
originated in the post war era, and started to become a stable force in the social and political
scene, the Turkish labor movement has been dominated by state concerns over national security,
and the level of freedom enjoyed by organized labor has been limited. In our work, we addressed
the outcome of the national security concerns over the organization efforts of the trade unions,
and display how these interventions interrupted the development of the trade unions since the
legalization of the labor movement in 1947. 
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